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ABSTRACTS

relief to first file a petition in a circuit court of West Virginia
seekng an evidentiary hearing. Sheftic v. Boles, 377 F.2d 423
(4th Cir. 1967).
The district court's refusal was based on an earlier case in which
it held on principles of comity and a desire to give state courts an
opportunity to redress invalid state convictions without federal
encroachment that state remedies must be exhausted. Miller v.
Boles, 248 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
The Court of Appeals in the principal case overrules the district
court's dismissal and clearly disapproves the Miller decision. The
Court of Appeals held that while the Supreme Court had not
ruled on this exact question it had held that where there were two
alternative methods for filing the writ in state procedures, it was
necessary to utilize only one in order to give state courts an
opportunity to pass on the matter. The Court of Appeals also
cited with approval a Third Circuit case which held it would be
unreasonable to expect the circuit court to grant a writ when the
Supreme Court of Appeals of that state had already denied the writ.
United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1952).
Criminal Law-Definition of Capital Offenses
P, fourteen years of age, was indicted for an alleged murder
committed at age thirteen. The case was set for trial in the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County under W. VA. CODE ch. 49,
art. 5, § 3 (Michie 1966) which provides that a juvenile court
shall have jurisdiction over persons under eighteen years of age
except for capital offenses. P contended that since capital punishment has been abolished in West Virginia, the juvenile court should
properly have jurisdiction. Held, writ of prohibition denied. Capital offenses include those punishable by life imprisonment. Since
murder in West Virginia is punishable by life imprisonment, P
could be tried by the intermediate court. State v. Wood, 155
S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1967).
This decision rested on the court's interpretation of the term
"capital offenses." W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 1, § 4 (Michie 1966)
defines delinquency as a crime not punishable by death or life
imprisonment, while W. VA. CODE ch. 49, art. 5, § 3 (Michie 1966)
just speaks of capital offenses without further definition. In order
to resolve the disparity in terminology, the court reasoned that
capital offenses, as used in W. VA. CODE cl. 49, art. 5, § 3 (Michie
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1966), must include all crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.
This question has previously arisen in the area of bail. Capital
offenses are not bailable, but it has been held that the abolition
of capital punishment makes all persons charged with a crime
bailable. 8 AM. JuR. 2d Bail and Recognizance §§ 30-31 (1963).
What this seems to be saying is that by abolishing capital punishment, the difference between capital offenses and other crimes
is also abolished. By statutory interpretation the West Virginia
court was able to reach an opposite result in the principal case.
Damages-Inadequacy of Verdict
P brought action to recover for property damage to her automobile and for personal injuries sustained in a rear end collision
negligently caused by D while P was waiting to turn at an intersection. P's husband, H, sought to recover for medical expenses
and loss of consortium occasioned by P's injuries. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of P but against H in disregard of instruction,
and judgment was entered thereon. A motion by P and H to set
aside the verdict and judgment on the grounds of inadequacy and
as showing, passion, prejudice, bias, or misconception of the law
was overruled. Held, affirmed as to P, reversed and remanded as
to H. Evidence of liability must be uncontroverted in order to
set aside a verdict. Furthermore, the jury having found in favor
of P, H became entitled as a matter of law to recover on his
derivative claim. Coakley v. Marple, 156 S.E.2d 11 (W. Va. 1967).
One of the issues which arose in this case concerned cricumstances under which a jury verdict for plaintiff may be set aside
on grounds of inadequacy. The court looked to Shipley v. Virginian Railway Co., 87 W. Va. 139, 104 S.E. 297 (1920), which
established the rule that the court may not set aside a verdict
because of inadequacy if the evidence is such that had the verdict
been for D the court could not set it aside. Since P's right to
recovery was a jury question in the principal case, the court did
not have the right to decide on its adequacy.
Another issue arising was the jury's apparent disregard for an
instruction. The trial court instructed that if they found for P,
they must also find for H and consider his damages. The court
found that the denial of recovery constituted a reversible error
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